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Introduction   
 
In the UK, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) keeps a record of all 
donors, licensed treatments and children born following the use of donated gametes and 
embryos. Initially access to such information was limited. However, the law changed on April 1, 
2005, with the implementation of the HFEA (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 
2004/1511. Fully anonymous donation was abolished and, once they reach the age of 18, those 
born with gametes donated after April 1, 2005 will be able to apply for identifying details of the 
donor. 
 
The change in the UK’s law was a response to the “right-to-know one’s genetic origins” claims 
brought by donor conceived individuals (Turkmendag et al. 2008). The right-to-know claims in 
the context of donor conception are mainly based on a presumption that genetic information is an 
essential component of personal identity, and consequently that it is in the best interest of 
children to know their genetic origins (Smart 2010). Increasingly, this is also linked to a rights-
based argument: children have a legal right to know their genetic origins (Wallbank 2004, Smart 
2010, Ravitsky 2010).i  The right-to-know is also recognised by the international legal 
framework of human rights through the Art 8(1) of the UN Convention on the Rights of Child, 
which stipulates “the right of the child to preserve his or her identity” and through jurisprudential 
interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights which provides a right 
to respect for private and family life. ii  
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Shortly after the removal of donor anonymity, on September 9, 2005, a sensationalist headline 
about a new assisted conception technique appeared on MailOnline: “The cloned baby with two 
mothers.”  Mailonline was referring to a new licence granted by the UK’s Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority to a research group at Newcastle University allowing them to 
develop a technique to prevent transmission of mitochondrial disease (HFEA 2005).  
 
Mitochondrial disease is a maternally inherited genetic condition that may cause morbidity and 
mortality. The risk of transmitting a mitochondrial disease is hard to assess through prenatal 
diagnosis, hence women known to harbor mitochondrial mutations can use donated eggs to 
prevent transmission of the disease (Nesbitt et al. 2014). Mitochondrial replacement techniques 
(MRT) promise hope to affected families that they will have a genetically connected child 
without faulty mitochondria. There are two central methods. In maternal spindle transfer, the 
spindle is removed from the intended mother’s egg and transferred into an egg from a donor that 
has had its maternal spindle removed. In pronuclear transfer, the pronuclei from the donor 
embryo are removed and replaced with the pronuclei from the intended parent’s embryo (POST 
2014).   In either case the maternal nuclear DNA remains in place. 
 
The Newcastle University team leading this research in the UK reported success in 2008 in 
creating embryos that have nuclear DNA from both the intended parents and mitochondrial DNA 
from the donor (“Three parent embryo formed in lab,” February 5, 2008, BBC News). Between 
September and December 2012, HFEA, who oversees the use of embryos and gametes in 
research and fertility treatment, ran a consultation to explore the social and ethical impact of 
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making these techniques available to patients (HFEA 2013a). In 2011, the HFEA also 
established a panel with broad-ranging scientific and clinical expertise to review the evidence; 
further reviews were carried out in 2013, 2014, and 2016 (HFEA 2016)iii. In March 2013, the 
HFEA advised the Government that “there is general support for permitting mitochondrial 
donation in the UK, so long as it is safe enough to offer in a treatment setting and is done so 
within a regulatory framework” (HFEA 2013b, para 1.7). Along with the HFEA, The Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics (NCoB), the UK’s independent body that examines the ethical issues 
around biomedicine, also recommended that MRT would be an ethical treatment option for 
affected families (NCoB 2012a). The Department of Health ran a consultation between February 
27 and May 21, 2014 to seek the views of stakeholders and the wider public (DoH 2014a). The 
respondents were “generally positive” about the proposed provisions by the government (DoH 
2014a, 6).  
 
After the public consultation process the regulations passed Parliament, and The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations came into effect on October 
29, 2015, making the UK the first country permitting the clinical use of this technique on 
humans. On December 15, 2016, the HFEA announced that they have decided to permit, in 
principle, the use of MRT in clinics to prevent the transmission of mitochondrial disease.  
 
The draft regulations were presented before Parliament under section 45(4) of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act) and made consequential amendments to 
provisions of the 1990 Act and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act from 2008, 
including provisions for donor information.  
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Having considered that some individuals born as a result of these techniques may wish to know 
more about the donor, the government took the view that mitochondrial-donor-conceived 
individuals should not have access to identifiable information about their donors (DoH 2014b). 
Specifically, according to the government, mitochondrial DNA is not as significant as nuclear 
DNA in determining one’s genetic identity (DoH 2014b), and therefore there is a difference in 
respect to the information collected and made available. Overall, the view was that mitochondrial 
donation fell somewhere between gamete donation and organ/tissue donation. Accordingly, The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 11 through 15 
modify the information provisions in the 1990 Act to enable children born following 
mitochondrial donation (referred as “mitochondrial donor-conceived person”) to access limited, 
non-identifying information about their “mitochondrial donor.” This allows individuals reaching 
the age 16, who think they may have been born as the result of mitochondrial donation, to apply 
to the HFEA to see if it holds any information about them on its register and allow them to 
obtain non-identifying information about the donor.iv  
 
 
As explained earlier, the ethical and legal debate that led to the removal of donor anonymity in 
the UK was phrased in the language of the rights of the offspring [child] (Turkmendag 2012). 
Regarding the existing legal framework that protects the right-to-know one’s genetic origins, and 
the trend of openness in donor conception, it is worth asking why the position of mitochondrial- 
donor-conceived persons were not aligned more closely with children born following gamete and 
embryo donation (thereafter referred as “donor-conceived person”).  
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Management of right-to-know in the context of MRT raises important questions about the 
meaning of genetic identity and what makes a human. Can we determine one’s genetic identity 
by simple calculations based on one’s genetic composition? Can such calculations be a valid 
reference point for granting or denying one’s human rights? These are the intertwining questions 
that I deal with in this paper.  
 
As Vaisman (2014) notes, new genetic technologies such as DNA identity testing are 
increasingly employed to establish individuals’ core characteristics, and these tests are also 
becoming a base for human rights claims. I argue that this trend can be observed in the context of 
both donor conception and MRT, where the right-to-know one’s genetic origins is decided based 
on assumptions about the genetic make-up of the offspring rather than the social context of 
conception. Both donor conception and MRT involve egg donation. In donor conception, the egg 
donor is perceived as a progenitor due to her (assumed fifty percent) genetic contribution. 
Accordingly, the regulations recognise the right-to-know of genetic origins for the individuals 
who are conceived by egg donation. In MRT, the mitochondria that the donor contributes (which 
is less than 0.1% of the total genetic make-up of the resulting child) is construed as insignificant 
to determine the personal characteristics of the offspring or relate the donor to the offspring. 
Therefore mitochondrial-donor-conceived individuals are denied the right-to-know.v This line of 
genetic thinking is evident in the UK government’s response to the consultation on MRT (DoH 
2014b, 15) which stresses that the donated mitochondrial DNA will not affect personal 
characteristics or the traits of the child (DoH 2014b, 30).vi It is further explained that in reaching 
this view the government considered the evidence of the sequencing of the mitochondrial DNA 
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(DoH 2014b, 30) which indicates that “all of the mitochondrial DNA genes are involved in 
mitochondrial energy production and none are involved in governing personal characteristics and 
traits.” Accordingly, the government concludes: 
 
Any relationship between the mitochondrial donor and any resulting child is remote, and 
in so far that there is any connection this is recognised by the regulations allowing for the 
sharing of non-identifying information in the same way (DoH 2014b, 30). 
 
As a result of this simplification, individuals who were conceived by assisted conception are 
granted different rights based on the perceived significance of the genetic material that played a 
role in their conception. If the mitochondrial-donor-conceived individual’s interest in knowing 
the identity of their donors was contextualised as a social need rather than one determined by a 
calculus of genes, there would be no reason to regulate the access to donor information 
separately from gamete-donor conception.  
 
In this paper, building on my previous work that examined the public debate that led to the 
removal of donor anonymity from gamete donors in the UK, I focus on the “mitochondria 
debate,” the public debate concerning whether these novel techniques should be made available 
for treatment. I particularly focus on how right-to-know one’s genetic identity in MRT was 
constructed in media coverage of these techniques, public consultation documents, and reports. 
In my analysis, I use “claims-making” approach, a term I borrow from social problems literature 
to identify frames and claims that were influential in ethical debates and policy-making (Spector 
and Kitsuse, 1977). 
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In the first part of the paper, after briefly introducing my approach to “claims-making,” I provide 
a background to the child’s-right-to-know discourse in the UK. In the second part of the paper, I 
examine the themes emerging from the public debate which explains the assumptions behind the 
donor information provisions in MRT regulations, including the mitochondrial-donor-conceived 
individuals’ interest in having access to identifiable information about their donors.  
Claims-making activities  
 
The terms “claims-making,” and “claim-makers” were coined by Spector and Kitsuse (1977) 
who suggested that social problems are not objective conditions; they are ‘the activities of 
individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative 
conditions’ (p.75).vii  According to Spector and Kitsuse, a claim is a demand that one party 
makes upon another (e.g., demanding services, lodging complaints, supporting and opposing 
some governmental practice or policy); claims-makers are the people who make claims; and 
audiences are the people who judge and evaluate the importance of these claims (1977).  
 
The MRT debate built on the previous public debate over donor anonymity where the conflicting 
interests of donors, offspring, and would-be parents are prevalent. In donor conception both 
donors and recipients make competing claims about the right-to-know. While their interests are 
congruent, they later diverge when privacy clashes with the right to knowledge of identity. 
Donor anonymity is often associated with higher donor supplies. It is assumed that more donors 
will come forward when their identity is maintained, whereas the resulting individuals might 
want to find about the identity of their donors. The would-be parents seem to have divergent 
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views about donor anonymity and disclosing the means of their origins to the donor-conceived 
children (Turkmendag et al. 2008). I argue that the donor information provisions in MRT 
regulations is a result of successful claims-making activities by the supporters of MRT. In order 
to secure donor anonymity and avoid the conflict, the advocates of MRT pressed claims to 
distinguish these techniques from donor conception. Strategically, they framed MRT as a form of 
tissue donation to be used for therapeutic purposes rather than an assisted conception method that 
involves egg donation, which raises questions about genetic identity. 
 
By examining the mitochondria debate in the public sphere my aim is to identify the successful 
claims about genetic identity that shaped the donor information provisions in the current MRT 
regulations. In this paper, I refer to “claims-making” as a rhetorical activity that involves 
construing socially acceptable accounts of the facts to promote a particular policy solution. Policy 
makers increasingly encourage wide-ranging public debate and consultation about emerging 
technologies (Williams et al. 2003). In many ways, the policy-making scene can be understood as 
a market place where claims-makers bid for public awareness, legal recognition, funding, and other 
scarce resources (Best 1987). Claims-makers learn ways to maintain public support, identify the 
key policy makers, and recognize the levers that can move policy (Best 1987). They also develop 
rhetorical strategies to shape the public's sense of what the problem is and persuade the audiences 
about a putative solution (Best 1987). 
 
One way of monitoring claims-making is to study the information available in the public sphere. 
As Conrad suggested (1997), in order to understand the lenses through which people come to 
understand particular problems an analyst needs to draw on the images and presentations 
9 
 
available to the “public eye”. The public eye includes news, television documentaries, 
periodicals, fiction and the Internet, opinion polls, government reports and statistics (Conrad 
1997). Other sources include: public consultation documents, parliamentary debates, political 
speeches, blogs, and comments in social media. In this paper, through examination of media 
news items and public consultation documents I identify the dominant constructions of MRT in 
the public eye, and discuss how certain claims about genetic identity, genetic materiality and 
genetic relatedness shaped the donor information provisions in MRT regulations. 
 
Claims-making during the removal of donor anonymity in the UK 
 
In the UK, the removal of donor anonymity owes its existence to the successful claims-making 
of children’s organizations that started in 1990s, including the Children’s Society, which was the 
first organization that called for a change in the law so that donor-conceived children could 
access identifying information about their donors (Turkmendag et al.  2008). The Children’s 
Society and other activists who campaigned for a change in the law stressed that children have 
the right-to-know their genetic origins, including having access to identifiable information about 
their donors (Turkmendag et al. 2008). They made a few important claims, including:  that 
genealogical information is central to the development of personal identity and to ascertaining 
one’s medical history; that openness and transparency are attributes central to family life; that 
parents are more likely to disclose the child her/his origins if donors are identifiable; and that the 
position of donor-conceived people should be aligned more closely with that of adopted people 
who have full access to identifying information about their “biological parents” (Turkmendag 
2012). Campaigners such as British Association of Social Workers Project Group on Assisted 
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Reproduction (PROGAR) further claimed that children have a legal right to know their genetic 
origins (PROGAR 2012).  
 
The Article 8 of UN Convention on the Rights of Child explicitly recognises the right to identity 
(de Andre 2010). The right-to-identity also has been recurrently invoked in the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (de Andre 2010). For example, in Rose and 
Another v Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin), in Judge Scott’s view it 
was quite clear that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights ECHR and the 
existing jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights supported the idea that “everyone 
should be able to establish details of his identity as a human being,” and that this clearly included 
the “right to obtain information about a biological parent who will inevitably have contributed to 
the identity of his child” (Rose, op. cit., n. 19, paras 47-48). There are also traces of the donor-
conceived child’s “right to know” in Strasbourg case-law on both paternity testing and the 
practice of anonymous birth (Mikulić v Croatia [2002] 1 FCR 720; Odièvre v France (2004) 38 
EHRR 43; Godelli v Italy[2012] ECHR 33783/09), and in provisions of the Article 8(1) UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which say that a child should be able to know her or his 
parents as far as possible. Similar debates happened elsewhere—notably in the US (Bernstein 
2010; Cohen 2012) and in Australia (Adams and Lorbach 2012), including the retrospective 
removal of donor anonymity. Recently, the Australian State of Victoria passed Assisted 
Reproductive Treatment Amendment Bill 2015, lifting donor anonymity retrospectively.viii 
 
Claims-making during the mitochondria debate  
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In order to study the claims-making that led to the regulations that govern the donor information 
in MRT, I examined the public consultation documents by the HFEA and DoH, the NCoB’s 
reports on mitochondria donation and donor conception, as well as the relevant news reports 
published in the UK press. I searched for the terms “mitochondria” and “donation” in the Nexis 
Library database for the period between September 2005 (since the Newcastle team was granted 
a licence for research) and December 2016, which contained 94 items (a majority of these items 
were published by The Times, The Guardian, The Independent, The Telegraph, and Daily Mail). 
I also searched for the same terms in BBC Online news archives for the same period and other 
web-based media sources. In this paper, drawing on my examination of the public consultation 
documents and the news items, I present a number of themes that I identified in the claims of 
those who promoted MRT. Although I do not claim that these themes are the only lenses through 
which the public came to understand the “child’s right-to-know” in the context of mitochondria 
donation, I argue that they played a role in shaping the current donor policy. In what follows, I 
present these under four headings: “Concerns about the donor shortage”; “Three-parent baby”; 
“Changing the battery”; and “Calculus of genes”. The first theme sets the scene for the donor 
recruitment in the UK. As I describe in this section, for the supporters of MRT it was essential to 
remove the (perceived) obstacles around donor recruitment to make these treatments available 
for clinical practice. The other three themes deal with the ways in which the mitochondria was 
construed in public debate, as quantitatively immaterial, qualitatively insignificant, and 
“relationally” irrelevant. These themes are intertwined more broadly to explain the putative 
importance of genes in making us unique individuals. 
Concerns about the donor shortage  
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There is an ongoing donor shortage in the UK. Today, increasing numbers of fertility patients 
who want to receive donor conception are seeking treatment abroad in countries that maintain 
donor anonymity. These patients report that the main reason for this travel for cross-border 
reproductive care is the shortage of sperm and eggs at home, a problem they associate with the 
removal of donor anonymity (Culley et al. 2011; Turkmendag 2013).ix In 2011, following a 
public consultation the HFEA acknowledged that the demand for donor treatment in the UK was 
greater than the supply of donors and that the removal of donor anonymity might have 
exacerbated this shortage (HFEA 2011).  As a result, the HFEA increased permitted levels of 
compensation for donors and established a National Donation Strategy Group (HFEA 2011). 
However, it is yet to be proven whether any of these measures can recover the number of donors, 
and resolve the donor shortage.  
 
According to Spector and Kitsuse (1977) claims-makers often have particular reasons for 
choosing particular rhetoric to address particular problems. The UK’s previous and ongoing 
donor shortage was one of the most important issues addressed during the mitochondria debate, 
as the social, legal, and ethical obstacles around the donor procurement had to be removed before 
these techniques became available for clinical application. The concern about the donor shortage 
was addressed in public consultation documents.  For example, in their evidence to NCoB, the 
scientists working in the field noted that there is increasing demand for eggs for both clinical 
practice and research into treatments for infertility and the causes of genetic disease, and that the 
supply has not kept pace with demand, disadvantaging the research and practice (NCoB 2012b). 
As a response, in its report the NCoB’s Working Group acknowledged that the legal status of the 
mitochondrial donor would affect the number and typical profile of donors who would come 
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forward (para 3.21). The potential donor recruitment problem was also acknowledged by the 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology in the case of mitochondrial donors. It noted 
that because removal of donor anonymity is often cited as a contributory factor to the current 
shortage, whether there will be sufficient supplies of eggs may depend on whether mitochondrial 
donors are allowed to donate anonymously (POST 2014). In other words, both policy makers and 
the scientists acknowledged that one of the central issues around the MRT’s translation to 
clinical practice was the procurement of the egg donors.  In her media brief to the Newcastle 
University’s press office, Professor Alison Murdoch of the Newcastle team showed support for 
the HFEA’s recommendation to protect the anonymity of the mitochondrial donors:x 
 
We welcome the HFEA's recommendation that mitochondria donors should be thought of 
as tissue donors, protecting the anonymity of the donor (20 March 2013). 
 
In her written evidence submitted to the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee, Professor Murdoch noted that donor anonymity would help in implementing the 
techniques: 
 
In Newcastle we have an established practice that recruits egg donors for both fertility 
treatment and for research. We are confident that, as long as the anonymity of donors is 
assured, we will have an adequate recruitment rate to implement a mitochondrial 
replacement treatment program (House of Commons 2014, 11). 
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Accordingly, introducing a donor recruitment policy that will help with donor procurement was 
perceived as important for the sustainability of the MRT:  if there are not enough women who 
come forward as egg donors, neither the research nor the treatment would be possible.  
 Arguably, these concerns played a role in the creation of a new donor category specific to the 
mitochondria replacement treatment: “mitochondrial donor,” a donor whose mitochondrial DNA 
(but not nuclear DNA) was used to make an egg or an embryo to be used in MRT. As Haimes 
and Taylor (2015) argue, these terms imply that the egg donor contributes only mitochondria. In 
fact, the egg contains “other cellular structures and chemical required by the intending parents’ 
nuclear DNA to direct the egg to develop into an embryo” (Haimes and Taylor 2015, 365). This 
framing is not accidental. As Haimes and Taylor note, it disguises the contribution of the egg 
donors and construes them as tissue donors. 
 
“Three-parent” baby 
 
Often, mass media constitute a key public arena in which the voices of claims-makers are put on 
public display to compete (Best 1987).  But the media also play a key role in how the claims-
makers and claims are framed, and which claims find credibility and legitimacy (Best 1987). 
When new developments in genetics raise complex ethical questions that are hard to answer 
quickly, the media often seek recourse by using metaphors to fill this ethical void––metaphors 
that may prepare the ground for normalizing and regularizing the new technology (Nerlich et al. 
2010). These metaphors play an important role in shaping public understanding of new scientific 
developments, as for most people a scientific fact is what they know from the press (Nelkin 
1987). Accordingly, it is possible that the metaphors used by both the claims-makers and the 
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media played a role in shaping public understanding of MRT. Using a corpus-based approach, 
Baker and Semino (2014) constructed a dataset including all news reports (114 articles) 
published in the UK between April 2010 (when the Newcastle team announced the technique) 
and September 2014. There were four key phrases used to describe the technique and hence 
frame the truth around it: The three-parent baby/babies metaphor was the most frequently 
occurring phrase in the data (40 instances). The battery metaphor occurred 38 times, making it 
the second most frequently occurring phrase, followed by designer baby/babies (33 instances) 
and genetically modified babies (12 instances).  
 
Jones and Holme (2013) argue that the classification of a donor as a “parent” was the media’s 
starting point for understanding the contribution of the mitochondrial donor. When MRT was 
first presented to the Human Genetics Commission, the Commission warned against regarding 
the mitochondrial donor as a “progenitor” or a “gamete donor,” and the loaded term “parent” was 
also avoided by both the HFEA’s Ethics and Law Advisory Committee and the NCoB in its call 
for evidence (Jones and Holme 2013). The concerns about “three-parent” metaphor were also 
reflected by the Progress Educational Trust, in their correspondence to Science and Technology 
Committee. The Trust reported that the parent metaphor was neither “helpful” nor “accurate” as 
a description of the relationship between the donor and the resultant child (House of Commons 
2014, 9). 
 
The “three-parent” metaphor was also evident in the relevant Parliamentary debates (Jones and 
Holme 2013), and in the public dialogue exercise and consultation conducted by the HFEA 
(HFEA 2013a). In its advice to government, the HFEA notes that people who oppose MRT argue 
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that the techniques would constitute an interference with the natural or spiritual aspect of 
reproduction, or that any manipulation of embryos is unethical (HFEA 2013a).  The report also 
mentions that some media reports have referred to MRT as “three-parent IVF,” as three 
individuals would be contributing DNA to create a child, and that respondents who referred to 
the donor as a third parent usually expressed concern about implications of MRT for the identity 
of the resultant person (HFEA 2013a). Similarly, during the government’s consultation on draft 
regulations, respondents who expressed the view that the donor should be regarded as a “third 
parent” were also opposed to the techniques being allowed in the UK (DoH 2014b). The 
Government’s response to these claims was as follows: 
 
We note that “three parent families” has been used in responses that wish to make a case 
for a strong link between the mitochondrial donor and the child. We regard this term as 
completely inappropriate (p.29).  
 
Discomfort with the third parent metaphor was also evident in media accounts of proponents of 
the research. In the following, Professor Robin Lovell Badge of MRC National Institute for 
Medical Research explains why donating mitochondria does not make one a parent: 
 
If the pronuclear and/or spindle transfer methods are adopted clinically […] any 
mitochondrial donor will be crucial to the outcome, namely to the birth of healthy 
offspring. But I personally do not think that we should get tangled up too much in a debate 
about whether they constitute a third parent or not. If I had eggs to give, I would be 
delighted that my mitochondria could help, but they would not convey any character 
that could be claimed as mine (Financial Times, 19 January 2012, emphasis added) 
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In another article published in the Guardian about the MRT, Professor Robin Lovell Badge says 
that the term “three parent IVF” should not be used, because the technique uses “a tiny, tiny bit 
of DNA” (“Scientists seek to implant embryos with genetic material from three parents,” 19 
April 2011). 
 
In the following extract, Professor Hugh Whithall, Director of the NCoB, makes a similar 
comment about the insignificance of the mitochondria. He notes that because the donor’s 
contribution to the conception of the child is limited, the technique does not make the donor a 
parent. He further distinguishes the egg donors as “egg donors for IVF” and “mitochondria 
donors,” and claims that the latter should not be required to be identifiable. 
 
Given that only some elements of the donor egg are used, not including the cell nucleus, 
we do not believe that it is legally or biologically correct to refer to the mitochondrial 
donor as “third parent” of the resulting child. We therefore argue that mitochondria 
donors should not be treated in the same way as egg donors for IVF, for example, they 
should not be required later to be identifiable to those born from their donation. (Science 
Media Centre, March 20, 2013) 
 
Remarkably, a brief look at some of the UK media headlines on mitochondrial donation suggest 
that the “three-parent” metaphor was gradually replaced by the more neutral “three-person” 
metaphor due to the successful claims-making by the proponents of the research. As an example, 
when the BBC first announced that scientists in Newcastle had successfully created embryos 
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using the novel MRT, the headline for the news was “Three-parent embryo formed in lab” 
(February 5, 2008). As the research advanced, BBC continued using similar headlines, although 
the loaded “three-parent” metaphor was gradually replaced by “three-person”; this change was 
cemented in the February 1, 2013 headline: “Three-person babies––not three-parent babies.” In 
February 2015, scientific community welcomed the House of Commons’ approval of the draft 
regulations the BBC reinforced––the “three-person” instead of “three-parent” metaphor.  A 
chronological overview of BBC headlines relating to MRT is shown below.  
 
 
September 8, 2005 Embryo with two mothers approved 
September 9, 2005 Concern over three-parent embryo 
February 5, 2008 Three-parent embryo formed in lab 
April 14, 2010  “Three-person IVF may prevent inherited disease” 
April 14, 2010  How scientists made three-person embryo 
June 12, 2012  Three-person IVF “is ethical” to treat mitochondrial disease 
September 17, 2012  Three people, one baby' public consultation begins 
February 1, 2013  “Three-person babies - not three-parent babies” 
June 28, 2013  UK government backs three-person IVF 
June 28, 2013  Three-person IVF should be “celebrated” 
September 19, 2013 Warning of three-person IVF “risks” 
February 27, 2014  Three-person baby details announced 
June 3, 2014   Three-person babies “in two years” - says science review 
February 3, 2015  MPs say yes to three-person babies 
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December 15, 2016  Babies made from three people approved in UK 
 
The successful claims-making by the proponents of the research may have played a role in 
changing how the media framed these novel techniques. However, it is worth noting that 
although the shift in language can be observed in BBC’s titles, this was not the case for all the 
media news I examined. During the period I studied, Mail Online, The Independent, The 
Telegraph, and The Times continued to use term “three-parent babies” in the news coverage, 
even when the techniques were framed as a promising treatment for the affected families. For 
example, “150 babies a year could be born to three-parent families: Children with DNA from 
two eggs and one sperm could be saved potentially lethal genetic disease” (Mail Online, January 
29, 2015); “Thousands of women could benefit from ‘three parent’ baby technique: New IVF 
techniques could cut some women’s risk of passing on genetic disease” (The Independent, 
January 28, 2015); “Three parent babies: There’s room for both the begotten and the made: 
There are far worse crimes than using reproductive science to help you or someone you love 
conceive a much-wanted, much loved child” (The Telegraph, June 29, 2013); and “Legalise 
three-parent babies, say Nobel winners”( The Times, January 29, 2015). 
 
Changing the battery 
 
As well as challenging the traditional boundaries of parenthood and the family, the MRT also 
constitutes a form of genetic modification (altering the DNA of gametes and embryos in a way 
that the change can be passed to future generations). It therefore raises more complex ethical 
issues and human rights questions than other reproductive technologies such as donor 
20 
 
conception, including the protection of human dignity and identity from harm, discrimination 
against genetic heritage, and potential risks of germ line modification for the future generations. 
Interventions on the human genome are prohibited by international instruments including the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (UNESCO, November 11, 
1997), The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity Of The Human Being 
with Regard To The Application of Biology and Medicine (Council of Europe, Oviedo, April 4, 
1997), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU, Nice, December 7, 
2000). The Declaration provides that germ-line interventions are contrary to human dignity 
(Article 24). The Convention prohibits interventions on the human genome unless they are 
undertaken “for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to 
introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants” (Article 13). The Charter provides 
that particular respect must be given to the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those 
aiming at the selection of persons (Article 3). None of these instruments are legally binding in 
the UK. 
 
One of the most prominent objections against germ-line modification is that altering the 
“essential characteristics” would violate the child’s right to an open future, a right originally 
identified by Joel Feinberg in 1980 (Bredenoord 2013). 
 
There are, however, different views on what constitutes a germ-line modification: some argue 
that only the nuclear DNA contains “essential characteristics” of a person, and that the 
modification of the mitochondria should therefore be considered less controversial than 
modification of nuclear DNA. According to Bredenoord, “no matter whether one modifies a 
(pathogenic) nuclear gene or a (pathogenic) mitochondrial gene, the identity of the future person 
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will be changed” (Bredenoord et al. 2011, 99). This is also the view taken by the Working Group 
when NCoB (2012a) examined the ethical issues raised by MRT.  The Working Group 
considered the potential impact of MRT on multiple aspects of identity including “self-
conception,” “qualitative identity,” “numerical identity,” and “genetic identity” (Paras 4.6-4.27). 
The Working Group took the view that mitochondrial disorders (or their absence) can affect the 
identity (para 4.27), and therefore MRT is identity-altering. However, The Group was sceptical 
of locating any distinction about the ethical acceptability of interventions on nuclear DNA or 
mitochondrial DNA in notions of identity, as any intervention would change the identity of the 
future person. The Working Group also felt that MRT “cannot be assumed to affect (or to 
negatively affect) their [the offspring’s] conception of ‘who they are’ ”, and it concludes that the 
resulting child’s right to an “open future”, as compared to not performing the therapy, is the key 
ethical test connected to identity (para 4.20-4.25).  
 
During the mitochondria debate, some of the claims included different descriptions of the genetic 
identity.  For example, The Independent reported Professor Dame Sally Davies’ statement that 
the mitochondria donation would not change the nucleus, which she construed as the essence of 
the identity:  
 
The majority of the DNA is in the nucleus—it’s the germline, it’s what makes us what 
we are, and there is no intention of looking at doing anything involving [replacement of] 
the nuclear DNA. (‘UK becomes first country in world to approve IVF using genes of 
three parents’, June 28, 2013, emphasis added) 
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Baylis (2013) argues that proponents of the techniques are keen to downplay the relevance of 
donated mitochondria in an individual’s genetic make-up. This can be observed in the accounts 
of the proponents of the research. These stakeholders promoted the idea that mitochondria does 
nothing more than provide energy for the cell. During the public debate, the “battery” metaphor, 
first introduced by Professor Sir John Burn of the Centre for Life in Newcastle, became an 
important discursive pattern used to describe the impact of MRT in the resultant person’s 
identity: 
 
I would use the analogy of simply replacing the battery in a pocket radio to explain what 
we are doing. You are not altering the radio at all––just giving it a new power source 
(MailOnline, September 9, 2005 emphasis added) 
 
This excerpt from Sir John Burn’s account suggests that MRT does not change the genetic make-
up of the offspring (as in replacing the batteries of a pocket radio does not change the radio). 
Similarly, Professor Doug Turnbull of the Newcastle team also used the battery metaphor to 
reinforce the idea that the technique would have no detrimental effects in the genetic make-up of 
the resulting child: 
 
What we've done is like changing the battery on a laptop. The energy supply now works 
properly, but none of the information on the hard drive has been changed. A child 
born using this method would have correctly functioning mitochondria, but in every other 
respect would get all their genetic information from their father and mother. (“Three-
person IVF 'may prevent inherited disease' ”, April 14, 2010, emphasis added) 
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During the mitochondria debate the “battery replacement” metaphor was not received well by the 
skeptics of the research, including scientists at the University of Sheffield, the University of 
Sussex and Monash University in Australia. These scientists expressed concern about a poor 
match between the donated mitochondrial DNA and the nuclear DNA from the parents. BBC 
cited Dr. Klaus Reinhardt from the University of Sheffield: “Describing it [MRT] as like 
changing the batteries in a camera [sic] is too simplistic.” (“Warning of three-person IVF ‘risks’ 
”, September 19, 2013). 
 
During the consultation, in their correspondence submitted to the Science and Technology 
Committee, Professor Justin C. St. John of Monash University noted that his group has been 
sceptical about the MRT based on the safety of the procedure and continued potential for 
transmission of the genetic defect. In his correspondence, he highlighted: 
It is not appropriate to merely suggest that the mitochondrion and the 
mitochondrial genome influence energy within the cells, they have a far more 
sophisticated role to play during development. It is well documented in the literature 
that mitochondrial DNA haplotypes predispose or protect individuals against severe 
diseases such as cancer (13), diabetes (14), Parkinson’s disease (15) and many other 
neurological disorders. (House of Commons 2014, 35, emphasis in original) 
In their evidence to the House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, Human 
Genetics Alert argued that “scientists are now increasingly coming to agree, [that] the symptoms 
of mitochondrial genetic disease are also not just faulty battery problems” and that the battery 
24 
 
analogy that was endorsed by the scientific community was a “classic example of the 
reductionist models of biology which dominate public discourse” (House of Commons 2014, 
39). Human Genetic Alert further claimed that the purpose of this metaphor was to minimize the 
ethical significance of the changes to the germline involved. 
But living organisms are simply not like computers: they are complex, whereas 
computers are merely complicated. Even were it true that the functions of mitochondria 
are restricted to generating ATP, the idea that energy metabolism can somehow be 
isolated from the rest of the physiology of the organism, is biologically laughable (House 
of Commons 2014, 41) 
There were other opposing voices. In an article published in The Independent fertility expert 
Professor Lord Robert Winston and Dr. Ted Morrow, an evolutionary biologist at Sussex 
University, claimed that Government had redefined genetic modification to exclude 
mitochondrial donation. Dr. Morrow noted: 
My impression is [that] the Government is doing all it can to contain and define these 
kinds of terms in ways that favour mitochondrial replacement being introduced as an 
uncontroversial therapy (“Scientists accuse government of dishonesty over GM babies 
in its regulation of new IVF technique,” 28 July 2014, emphasis added) 
According to The Sunday Times Dr. Morrow said “The idea the mitochondrial DNA only affects 
battery function is just not true.” He further noted: 
Mitochondria influence fertility, ageing, longevity, cognitive ability. All these diseases 
that are caused by faulty mitochondria, with all sorts of symptoms ... that tells you 
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something about what mitochondria are involved in. So to say that they're not important 
because they are only 37 genes, and at the same time say, “Ah, but they cause all these 
terrible diseases”––logically, that doesn't match up. They are either important or 
they're not. (“Why we want the first three-parent baby,” February 1, 2015 emphasis 
added) 
In these excerpts, Dr. Morrow criticizes government for using rhetorical strategies to gain public 
support for MRT rather than presenting the scientific facts. While the proponents of MRT 
refused the “three-parent child” metaphor for its inaccuracy, they introduced an equally 
inaccurate “battery replacement” analogy to persuade the public that the techniques are simple as 
well as socially and ethically unproblematic. Even though such claims may not be scientifically 
accurate, downplaying the significance of the mitochondria was a successful rhetorical strategy 
used to overcome the ethical objections against the MRT and pass the regulations to make these 
novel techniques available for the patients.  
 
Calculus of genes 
 
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the mitochondria debate in the UK is the use of 
what I refer to as a “calculus of genes,” a form of quantitative reasoning which uses a percentage 
calculation of DNA transmitted through the mitochondrial donation as a base for determining the 
donor’s relational status to the offspring. As I discuss later on, this calculus of genes played a 
role both in distancing MRT from the donor conception and germline modification line of 
argument and in reinforcing the idea that MRT is more akin to organ donation.    
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Even though it has its own DNA, mitochondria mainly provides energy for the cell. Because the 
mitochondrial DNA constitutes 0.1% of the DNA of the cell, it is considered insignificant in 
terms of determining the characteristics of an individual. However, this is not a settled issue in 
science (Bredenoord et al. 2011). Little is known about the mitochondria’s functioning 
(Thorburn et al. 2001), but a few studies have linked mitochondria to cognitive functioning, 
Alzheimer’s disease and susceptibility to alcoholism (Picard and McEwen 2014; Mancuso et al. 
2009; Hoek et al. 2002).  
 
The distinction between nuclear DNA and mitochondrial DNA was perceived as very important 
in determining the legal status of the donor. In “Mitochondria replacement consultation: Advice 
to Government” the HFEA reports that people’s views on the significance of mitochondrial DNA 
also determined how they conceptualized the relationship between the donor and the child 
(HFEA 2013b).  While in the beginning of the consultation about a third of the participants held 
the view that a child should have the right to know about their donor, those who did not think the 
child had a right to know, increased during this process from 31% at the start to 45% at the end 
(HFEA 2013b). The respondents who felt that no-information or non-identifying information 
should be provided saw MRT as more like blood or tissue donation rather than egg or sperm 
donation, and so concluded that the donor’s identity need not be disclosed (para. 6.47). 
Accordingly, it is possible that the number of respondents who saw MRT more akin to tissue 
donation than donor conception increased during the consultation.  The government’s response 
to the DoH’s consultation also reflects this genetic thinking:  
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Gamete donors, who contribute 50 per cent of the genes of a child born as a consequence 
of their donation, are not treated as the legal parent of any resulting child and there is 
therefore no justification to regard mitochondrial donors, who would provide only 0.1 per 
cent of the child’s genes, as such (p.29). 
 
Another example of calculus of genes is as follows. After the passage of the law in the House of 
Commons, Dr. Gillian Lockwood, a reproductive ethicist, told BBC that although this was a 
“small change” in the law, there were problems in allowing the technique to be represented as 
“three-parent IVF”; it should be referred to as “2.001-parent IVF.” Dr. Lockwood referred to the 
fact that the mtDNA constitutes 0.1% of the DNA. Accordingly, the correct calculation that 
Lockwood suggested would be as follows: 100% (1) genetic contribution of the mother+100% 
(1) genetic contribution of the father+1% (0.001) mitochondrial contribution from the 
donor=2.001 parent IVF (though the mother’s mitochondria would be replaced by the donor’s, 
thereby amounting to 2 in total, instead of 2.001). 
 
The biggest problem is that this has been described as three-parent IVF. In fact it is 
2.001-parent IVF. Less than a tenth of one per cent of the genome is actually going to be 
affected. It is not part of what makes us genetically who we are. It doesn't affect height, 
eye colour, intelligence, musicality (“MPs say yes to three-person babies,” 3 February 
2015).  
 
In this open debate there were opposing voices: PROGAR, who also campaigned for a legal right 
to know for donor-conceived children, argued that the mitochondrial donor’s anonymity could 
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still leave the resulting children with questions about her identity that cannot be answered.  The 
organization’s view was that the identity of individuals conceived through assisted conception 
technologies is affected not only by the transmission of genes from genetic parents or by 
individuals directly involved in gestation as well as the environmental influences, but also by the 
meaning that such origins holds for them (PROGAR 2012, 28).  
 
However, the majority of those who participated in the consultation felt that mitochondria 
donation is unique and is not directly comparable to any other form of donation, and a child 
should not have the right to know about their donor; and that mitochondrial donors should be 
anonymous (HFEA 2013b, paras 6.57-6.63). As a result, the HFEA advised the government that 
mitochondrial donors should have a similar status to that of tissue donors, and that children born 
of mitochondria replacement should not have a right to access identifying information about the 
donor (para 1.13). This view was also endorsed by the Nuffield Council of Bioethics (NCoB 
2012a).  
 
The reports that NCoB published on mitochondrial donation (2012a) and donor conception 
2012b(2013) provide important insights into how the right-to-know is construed differently in 
these two practices, partly because of the assumptions about the effect of these techniques on the 
offspring’s genetic identity, and partly because of the concerns about how MRT will be 
perceived by the public.   
 
In both reports, the NCoB is cautious to avoid taking a genetic essentialist view of identity. In 
the donor conception report, rather than insisting that possession of identifiable information 
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about one's gamete donor is an essential component of one's identity, The Working Group 
concluded that context has to be center-stage in considering management of donor information 
(NCoB 2013). Similarly, in its report on mitochondrial donation, The Group took the view that 
the social and genealogical information sought in donor conception is more about “seeking social 
information or a narrative related to a specific, limited element” of one's biological origins 
(NCoB 2012a, para 4.23). The NCoB’s view is in line with the ECHR law, which “privileges a 
narrative and developmental idea of individual identity” (de Andrade, 2010, 429). In general, the 
international legal framework of human rights supports the right to personal identity, although in 
this context, personal identity is perceived as a narrative that each person needs to build during 
their lives. de Andre notes that in human rights law, “the relevance and weight attributed to the 
concept of genetic identity (as the right to identity encompassing genetic characteristics) has not 
been extrapolated,” and this approach prevents engaging with genetic essentialism that reduces a 
person to her genetic characteristics (2010, 432). 
 
However, regarding mitochondrial donation, rather than abandoning the notion of genetic identity, 
The Working Group of the NCoB introduced a new categorization of identity. The report notes 
that MRT would introduce “only a very small change to the resulting child's mitochondrial genetic 
identity,” in that the techniques would enable a person to be born who is genetically distinct from 
the person who might have been naturally conceived by his or her parents (NCoB 2012a, para 
4.25). Similar to the putative distinction between the “mitochondrial donor” and the “egg donor,” 
this new categorization of genetic identity also distinguishes the mitochondrial donor-conceived 
person from a donor-conceived person, whose genetic identity was altered 50 percent.  The 
Working Group compares the change in “mitochondrial genetic identity” to that of the genetic 
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make-up of a donor-conceived person, based on a “calculus of genes,” and as a result of this 
calculation it ascribes MRT less social significance than donor conception:  
 
A gamete donor contributes 50 percent of the child’s unique nuclear genetic make-up, the 
full complement of the child’s genetic contribution from either the maternal or paternal 
source. Taken alone, mitochondrial genes do not uniquely link the resulting child to their 
donor in the same way that a donation of nuclear genes would do. (para 4.113)  
 
In order to support this view, the report also quotes evidence presented by Susan Golombok that 
mitochondrial donor-conceived children may be “much more like naturally conceived children, 
than donor-conceived children” (para 4.113), although it is not clear how such differences can be 
assessed.    
 
Overall, the NCoB’s Working Group felt that the legal status of the mitochondrial donor would 
influence the perception of recipient families as to any social relationship that could be created 
by MRT (para 3.21). The Working Group took the view that mitochondrial donors should not be 
treated as gamete donors, and should not be mandatorily required to be identifiable to the 
individuals born from their donation (para 5.14), an approach that was taken in the Mitochondrial 
Donation Regulations. The view of NCoB on MRT does not necessarily suggest that the Council 
encourages anonymous donation in general. In contrast, more recently, regarding the information 
sharing in practices of donor conception, the NCoB’s Working Group concluded that “other 
things being equal, it will usually be better for children to be told, by their parents and at an early 
age, that they are donor-conceived” (NCoB 2013b, para 6.3). The Working Group also called for 
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the state to take action to increase awareness among past donors to become identifiable, and 
“nudge” parents towards disclosure (NCoB 2013b).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
During the UK’s mitochondria debate, those who supported MRT based their claims on 
simplified and reductionist assumptions about how genes makes us who we are. This calculus of 
genes was evident in both public consultation documents and the accounts of those who 
promoted MRT. Such claims largely drew on donor’s genetic contribution to the offspring’s 
genetic make-up, rather than on the potential meaning of the donation for the parties involved.  
Overall, the donors were rendered invisible (Haimes and Taylor 2015) during the mitochondria 
debate, possibly because the donor’s identity in the context of MRT was deemed too disruptive 
for both donor procurement and the traditional notions of parenthood and family. As a result, the 
mitochondrial-donor-conceived child’s interest in access to identifiable information about the 
donor was given less weight. This also meant that individuals who are conceived by the use of 
donated eggs and embryos in the UK are granted different rights based on whether their 
conception involves using nuclear DNA or mitochondrial DNA.  
The UK will soon be home to at least five different types of adults who are conceived by the use 
of donated egg, sperm, and embryos. Specifically, from 2023, when the first children to whom 
the 2005 amendment applies will have reached the age of 18, there will be: (1) those born with 
gametes donated after 1 April 2005 who will have access through a register maintained by the 
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HFEA to identifying information about their donors; (2) those born with gametes donated 
between August 1991 (when the HFE Act came into force) and 1 April 2005 who will have 
access to non-identifying information but nothing more unless their donor “re-registers” with the 
HFEA; (3) those born before the Act came into force who will have access to no information at 
all through the register (though there may be records that can help at the clinics where they were 
conceived); (4) those conceived through non-clinical arrangements for sperm donation; and (5) 
those conceived at clinics outside the UK. Neither of the latter two groups will have access to 
information via the register. However, there was no discrimination between these individuals 
based on the nature and quantity of the donated reproductive material (eggs, sperm, or embryos) 
used for their conception until the arrival of MRT, which added a sixth group (6) those 
conceived by “mitochondrial donation” who will have access to non-identifying information 
about their donors.   
Should individuals born as a result of mitochondria therapy, as is proposed, be denied the right to 
access identifying information about the donor that is available to individuals born of donated 
gametes? It seems that, in part, the driving force behind MRT regulations was the assumption that 
more donors would come forward to provide eggs if their anonymity was protected. However, if 
maintaining donor anonymity is an important factor for the sustainability of donor conception, the 
government should reconsider its donor policy rather than causing discrimination for individuals 
who will be born as a result of MRT. As proposed by Pennings (1997) in the context of donor 
conception, the most obvious alternative disclosure policy in all forms of third party reproduction 
would be to let the parties decide for themselves.  
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I argue that under the current policy donor-conceived individuals can access identifying 
information about their genetic origins, and so it is discriminative to deny this information to the 
mitochondrial donor-conceived individuals. After all, the children born from MRT will grow up 
in a culture where donor-conception families are repeatedly told that it is in a child’s best interests 
to be told about their origins, including having access to identifiable information about their 
donors. Although having access to their donor’s identity might not be important to MRT offspring, 
it is unlikely that they will accept the assumption that they have less interest in knowing their 
donors than donor-conceived individuals based on a simple calculus of genes. The question is not 
who should be entitled to their genetic origins, but whether a calculus of genetic relatedness is a 
good basis for considering a child’s interest in the right-to-know. 
 
Griffiths (2016) argues that MRT is an example of how science and regulation seek to reconfigure 
traditional boundaries surrounding parenthood and the family without challenging the existing 
order, which is also at the centre of UK’s family law and legislation (McCandless and Sheldon 
2014) . Yet, there are wider implications of the current mitochondrial donor policy. The public 
consultation documents and the media accounts of the promoters of MRT reveals a rhetorical 
strategy based on undermining the significance of mitochondrial DNA with respect to the nuclear 
DNA. The latter is often framed as the “essence of identity and the basis of human difference” 
(Nelkin 1994, 26). Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011, 800) warn that genetic essentialism reinforced 
by the representations of genes in public discourses is dangerous, because “people are influenced 
by scientific arguments regarding the role of genes in their lives in some profound ways that are 
distinct from learning about other kinds of scientific arguments.” Genetic essentialist biases may 
play a role in shaping people’s understandings of race, gender, sexuality, disability, and disease, 
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or even effect the ways they are treated by those who are in power, as exemplified by the dark 
history of eugenics (Kerr et al. 1998).  The reductionist and simplified accounts of genes also 
influences the ways in which we understand what makes us human, and the rights we have as 
humans. Although the current MRT policy might be desirable if the UK wants to be in the forefront 
of mitochondria research, we have to be mindful of the wider implications of such genetic thinking, 
which legitimizes defining human and human rights based on a calculus of genes.  
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